Learning from abroad: the Austrian Competence Centre Programme Kplus by Biegelbauer, Peter
www.ssoar.info
Learning from abroad: the Austrian Competence
Centre Programme Kplus
Biegelbauer, Peter
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Biegelbauer, P. (2007). Learning from abroad: the Austrian Competence Centre Programme Kplus. Science and Public
Policy, 34(9), 606-618. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-320340
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Science and Public Policy, 34(9), November 2007, pages 606-618 
DOI: 10.3152/030234207X264926; http://wwwingentacomectxom/content/beech/spp
Learning from abroad: the Austrian 
competence centre programme Kplus
Peter Biegelbauer
In 1998 the first competence centre programme was introduced to Austria. The programme was a 
major policy innovation for the country, not only due to its novel instruments and goals, but also 
because it was created in a new way, breaking with the policy style dominant in the RTD policy field 
before. The paper looks into the question why this major policy innovation could take place. This 
analysis applies a policy learning approach, and considers the knowledge resources utilized for the 
programme creation, implementation and évaluation as well as the forms of learning which took place.
IN 1998 A NEW RESEARCH and technological development (RTD) policy programme was cre- ated in Austria, which was radically different from previous policy measures. This initiative, the 
competence centre programme Kp-us, was not new by 
international standards -  indeed it was strongly 
influenced by predecessors in other Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries, such as Canada and Sweden. Yet for Aus­
trian RTD policy-making it meant a radical innova­
tion in the sense that the new policy instrument not 
only was large by national standards, but also that it 
was more complex than any RTD policy measure 
hitherto.1 Moreover the process leading to the Kplus 
Programme was quite unusual for Austrian RTD 
politics, because it bore not much resemblance to the 
otherwise dominant style of policy-making. Pre­
viously in Austrian RTD politics all relevant minis­
tries, various federal actors, external experts and
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social partners were included in intricate discussion 
processes. These resembled the policy style devel­
oped in other policy fields in the framework of neo- 
corporatist political arrangements -  the Austrian 
social partnership of cooperation between employ­
ers’ and employees’ organizations (Karlhofer and 
Talos, 1999, 2005; Kittel and Talos, 2001; Pelinka, 
1981).
The role of the Kplus Programme is all the more 
important as it was quickly perceived as a success 
story (OECD, 2004; Edler et al, 2004) and served as 
a model for other policy programmes on the national 
as well as the international level. Similarly the crea­
tion of an independent agency operating at arm’s 
length from government, the Technology Impulse 
Agency (Technologie Impulse Gesellschaft, TIG), 
with the main task of managing the Kplus Pro­
gramme, created a point of reference for Austrian 
RTD policy-making in the 2000s.
This paper tries to answer the question why a 
major policy innovation such as the Kplus Programme 
was possible in an RTD system, which before re­
jected changes for a prolonged period of time 
(Mayer, 2003). It is also interested in the question 
how the programme developed in the following 
years, marked by frequent and encompassing 
changes in the Austrian RTD system. In an attempt 
to answer these questions the paper analyses the pol­
icy process leading up to the Kplus Programme 
beginning from the mid 1990s, when the idea of 
having competence centres in which science and in­
dustry would work together in the form of public-
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private partnerships first came on the political 
agenda. Further analysis pertains to the creation of 
the Kplus Programme in 1998, its implementation in 
the following years and its assessment in 2003 as 
well as the following reformulation of the compe­
tence centre programmes ( Kplus and others). Such an 
analysis then can chart the full policy cycle of a pro­
gramme, thus attempting to tell the ‘whole story’ 
and circumvent a concentration on the first phases of 
the heuristic policy cycle, from agenda-setting to 
policy-making.
The analysis will be carried out from the perspec­
tive of policy-oriented learning, or ‘policy learning’ 
in short. Policy-learning approaches want to explain 
policy change by looking at the reflexive capabilities 
of political actors and their ability to adapt to chang­
ing environments, mostly by analysing longer 
periods of time. And indeed the case study at hand 
offers ample opportunities to look at policy changes 
over the time span of 10 years in Austrian RTD 
policy-making.
Several approaches have been developed utilizing 
the notion of policy learning, with different conceptu­
alizations of actors, places and fora of learning, re­
flected in concepts such as policy diffusion (Bennett, 
1991; Drori et al, 2003), transfer (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 2000; Page, 2000; De Jong et al, 2002), learn­
ing (Hall, 1993; Sabatier, 1998; Griessler and Hadolt, 
2006) and lesson-drawing (Rose, 1993, 2005).2 The 
approaches utilizing the policy-learning notion 
proper share a conviction that the actions of policy­
makers can be explained by understanding those ac­
tions in terms of feedback cycles used to assess pre­
vious actions. Policy-makers engage in learning in 
order to make sense of the world they live in, to gain 
a better understanding of the effects of their policies 
and to arrive at better decisions in the future.
Although there is a consensus on these basic in­
gredients of the notion of policy learning, no gener­
ally accepted standard definition of the term has 
been developed as of now. The definition utilized 
here is the following: ‘policy learning’ stands for the 
production of policy-relevant knowledge, skills or 
attitudes, which are the result of the assessment of 
past, present or possible future policies.
Furthermore, learning does not have to be based 
on some kind of strict evaluation that typically might
Research on policy learning has to 
resort to explaining political action by 
closely analysing actions, their 
justification and interpretations by the 
actors
be explicit, systematic and planned, although this 
may be the case. Learning, as understood here, may 
be a relatively unsystematic act, happen alongside 
other daily practices, as for example in the case of 
4 learning by doing ’.
Actors follow a bounded rationality (Simon, 
1957); they have limited resources and have to live 
with sub-optimal solutions due to their limited cog­
nitive and material resources, this giving rise to sat­
isficing behaviour in which they also may accept 
‘second-best’ solutions in order to preserve scarce 
resources such as time. Moreover, they can draw the 
‘wrong’ lessons, again because of limited resources, 
but also due to unclear information situations or in­
appropriate frameworks of interpretation.
This has several consequences for the observation 
and the ensuing analysis of learning. Most impor­
tantly, it is not possible to observe learning directly 
-  a difficulty the concept shares with other social 
science notions and which has been discussed else­
where (May, 1992; Maier, 2003). Moreover, partici­
pant observation most of the time cannot be 
employed in policy analysis. Research on policy 
learning therefore has to resort to explaining politi­
cal action by closely analysing actions, their justifi­
cation and interpretations by the actors as well as 
looking at the knowledge resources utilized in the 
policy process in order to draw inferences on the 
existence and nature of policy learning (Biegelbauer, 
2007a).
With all the concentration upon learning, it is im­
portant not to forget about other categories of social 
science such as power, representation and interests. 
Without taking into account power relations between 
policy actors -  visible and invisible (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962; Digeser, 1992) — it is not possible to 
arrive at a sensible interpretation of political actions. 
Policy learning takes place before and in the frame­
work of power relations; sometimes it is even driven 
by these (Braun and Benninghoff, 2003).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: 
First, a short overview of agenda-setting, policy- 
finding and -making, implementation and assess­
ment of the Kplus Programme will be provided. Then 
an analysis of the specifics and origins of knowledge 
utilized in the policy process will be carried out, 
combined with an account of different elements of 
policy-learning found. As part of the last section the 
original research questions will be revisited.
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The Austrian RTD system in the 1990s
A failed initiative
The decision of the Austrian Government to raise a 
milliard Schilling (approximately €70 million) for 
new RTD measures caused a small group of civil 
servants in the newly created Ministry for Science, 
Transport and the Arts (Österreichisches Bundes­
ministerium für Wissenschaft, Verkehr und Kunst, 
BMWVK) to think about how the money was to be 
spent. In 1996 a paper was tabled, which featured 
the title ‘Knowledge as a Factor of Production’ 
(Stampfer, 1996). By this time both civil servants 
and researchers were disillusioned with the available 
RTD policy instruments in Austria, consisting 
mainly of institutional and project funding (inter­
views 3-5, 3-13; see Appendix). While the ministry 
officials wanted an instrument to structure the Aus­
trian RTD system, the researchers wanted to have a 
longer planning horizon in order to engage in larger 
projects. For the first time in the Austrian discussion 
on RTD policy, the paper ‘Knowledge as a Factor of 
Production’ used the term competence centre for 
such a policy instrument combining treats of basic 
funding and project financing (Stampfer, 1996: 9). 
Although the instrument was largely under-defined, 
already by then it was clear that competence centres 
should be a cooperative RTD policy instrument in 
which different kinds of organizations, such as uni­
versities, extra-university research organizations, 
polytechnics and companies, should work together. 
There should be diverse funding sources, including 
the federal government, industry and the states 
(Länder).
In February 1997 the heads of the coalition gov­
ernment, Chancellor Klima and Vice-Chancellor 
Schüssel, declared Albert Hochleitner, the General 
Director of Siemens Austria, and Amo Schmidt, the 
Director of the Basic Science Research Fund (Fonds 
zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung, 
FWF), to be their technology advisors. They had the 
task of writing a concept for the RTD policy of the 
Austrian Government — something they fulfilled by 
presenting the paper ‘Research and Competition: 
Technology Offensive for the 21st Century’ four 
months later (Schmidt and Hochleitner et al, 1997).
As part of a planned reorganization of Austrian 
RTD policy, three funds were proposed: a new fund 
for competence centres, impulse programmes and 
governmental initiatives (KIR: Kompetenzzentren, 
Impulsprogramme, Regierungsinitiativen). The In­
dustrial Research Promotion Fund (Fonds zur 
Förderung der gewerblichen Forschung, FFF) should 
stop financing RTD in all kinds of firms, but con­
centrate on small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
whereas the FWF should keep its concentration on 
basic research. The Innovation and Technology 
Fund (Innovations- und Technologiefonds, ITF), un­
til then the sole instrument of government to finance 
top-down RTD programmes, should be dissolved.
Austrian competence centre programme
One of the main funding sources for the new gov­
ernment initiatives should be the European Recovery 
Programme (ERP) Fund, which had been formed out 
of the remnants of the US Marshal Plan three dec­
ades earlier. The concept of competence centres had 
been concretized in the policy paper, ‘Research and 
Competition’. It was now stipulated that the financ­
ing of such a centre should be secured for five years 
and that it should be evaluated frequently.
The months following the presentation of the 
paper were filled with lengthy discussions and lob­
bying by a number of actors. While the chancellor 
and vice-chancellor had given signals that they fa­
voured the initiative, it faced resistance from several 
sides. First, the minister for science and transport 
and the minister for economic affairs had already 
been unhappy with the appointment of the two tech­
nology advisors to the government, as they had 
taken on tasks which under normal circumstances 
would have been theirs. In fact the ministers were 
confronted with a complete reorganization plan of 
the Austrian RTD system they had not agreed upon.
But not only the ministers were unhappy; a num­
ber of civil servants were, too. Especially the highest 
level of ministry officials would have lost influence 
to an outside agency in a way that was unprece­
dented in Austrian post-WWII administrative his­
tory. Another organization, which not only would 
have lost influence, but would also have been dis­
solved in the way it had existed before, was the ERP 
Fund. This organization, which had successfully fi­
nanced infrastructure and RTD efforts of Austrian 
companies for more than three decades could raise 
concerns about a possible limitation of the usage of 
ERP funds because the money was a gift from the 
US Government, which however had limited the 
usage of these funds. In addition the ERP Fund also 
mobilized its clientele — Austrian firms — in order 
to defend its existence (interview 2-11).
In the face of the overwhelming resistance an 
inter-ministerial working group was established to 
further discuss these issues, a step described by an 
interview partner as a “funeral, first class” (interview 
3-4). Indeed, for the time being, this was the end of 
the Schmidt-Hochleitner initiative. It was perhaps 
the most spectacular in a long row of failed attempts 
to reform the Austrian RTD system.
Radical innovation: the Kpius Programme
In September 1997 a mid-level civil servant from the 
Ministry for Science and Transport (BMWV) com­
missioned the preparatory work for a programme 
enhancing public-private partnerships. In a few 
months’ time a group, which consisted of a few pol­
icy consultants involved in the Technology, Infor­
mation and Policy Consulting Programme of the 
Austrian Government (Technologie, Information, 
Politikberatung, TIP) and the young official from the 
BMWV who already had taken an important role in 
the previous policy papers ‘Knowledge as a Factor
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of Production’ and ‘Research and Competition’ 
came forward with a paper advancing a competence 
centre programme. An extended working group 
brought together by the BMWV consisted, besides 
the already mentioned ministry official and policy 
consultants, also of representatives of the social 
partners, that is the Chambers of Commerce and 
Labour, the head of the FWF and sometimes also in­
cluded one personal assistant from the science and 
transport minister’s cabinet. The policy paper was 
presented twice in front of a group of representatives 
of companies and the Austrian Chamber of Com­
merce as well as before a group of scientists and 
FWF representatives (interview 3-3).
By December 1997 the paper ‘Kpius Research 
Competence plus Economic Competence’ (BMWV, 
1997) entailed most of the details of what later 
would be realized in the competence centre pro­
gramme Kpius. The rationale of the programme was 
the reaction to three of the most hotly debated RTD 
policy problems in Austria during the 1990s: the 
weak links between universities and industry, the in­
sufficient orientation of universities towards indus­
trial research and the low level of our RTD 
expenditures of firms (BMWV, 1997: II).3
The Kpius Programme should promote the coopera­
tion between academia and industry and “therefore 
foster the competitiveness of both, the Austrian 
economy and its science system” (BMWV, 1997: 
II). The paper proposed the establishment of 20 
competence centres, which should be based on 
partnerships between universities, industry and the 
government. In these centres, researchers from 
universities and companies should work together, 
financed through federal and state sources up to 
60%, with the private sector adding the rest of the 
budget.
One of the innovative assets of the proposed 
programme was that the selection procedures for the 
centres were to be strictly based on a set of criteria, 
which was to be published well before the calls for 
proposals and which would form the basis of a two- 
stage process. In the first stage only a small paper 
would have to be handed in, while in the second 
stage a fully fledged proposal would be evaluated. 
The selection would be based on international peer- 
review processes only. Furthermore foreign compa­
nies would be invited to take part in the centres so as
Of foremost importance were the 
extent and the quality of the industrial 
participation, the research programme 
of the centres and the organizational 
and management plans
to ensure that these were embedded in an inter­
national and competitive environment. The policy 
paper extensively elaborates the criteria after which 
the Kpius centres should be chosen and evaluated. Of 
foremost importance were the extent and the quality 
of the industrial participation, the research pro­
gramme of the centres and the organizational and 
management plans. Several independent firms were 
to participate in one centre together with research 
organizations. This cooperation should not only en­
tail common RTD work, but also include the training 
of young researchers and the exchange of personnel.
The centres were to consist of 25 to 60 persons af­
ter an initial growth-phase of three years, which 
should end with an evaluation of the centre. In the 
case of positive evaluation, further funding should 
be granted for four more years. According to the pa­
per after these seven years a second seven-year term 
could be applied for — a clause later dropped. The 
Minister for Science and Transport, Caspar Einem, 
was not involved in the processes which led to the 
Kpius Programme but was kept informed through his 
cabinet. When confronted with the plans for the 
RTD initiative, he quickly decided to use a part of 
the Technology Milliard, which had been realized 
through a law in July 1997, for a pilot phase of the 
Kpius Programme, which began in 1998 (interviews 
3-3, 3-5).
Another problem waiting to be solved was where 
the new programme should be situated. Already dur­
ing 1998 the decision had been taken that the pro­
gramme should be not carried out inside the 
BMWV, but that the management of the initiative 
should be the task of an independent agency. The 
Technology Impulse Agency (TIG) was the first in­
dependent operative Austrian RTD agency that 
would initiate programmes and guidelines, engage in 
projects and feature a very specific mission, which 
was to manage cooperative research programmes. 
The organization was, similar to FFF and FWF, 
quite independent in its decisions, despite the fact 
that it managed programmes financed mainly by the 
BMWV, which two years later became the Ministry 
for Transport, Innovation and Technology 
(Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Verkehr, 
Innovation und Technologie, BMVIT). The TIG 
was founded in 1999, at a time when the pilot 
phase of the Kpius Programme was already well 
under way.
Another initiative: the Kind and Knet Programmes
In 1998, some time after the efforts to create what 
later would become the Kpius Programme had started 
in the Ministry for Science and Transport (BMWV), 
the Ministry for Economic Affairs (Österreichisches 
Bundesministerium fur wirtschaftliche Angelegen­
heiten, BMwA) engaged in a plan to construct its 
own competence centres programmes. These efforts 
were successful and led to the establishment of the 
Kind industrial competence centres and Knet
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competence networks. The Kind and Knet Pro­
grammes also served the development of technology 
clusters and both were run by business enterprises 
and research organizations in the same time frames 
as the Kpius Programme.
Besides the general aim and the idea proposed in 
the cooperation between science and industry, 
many other similarities can be found between the 
competence centre programmes stemming from the 
two ministries. Examples are the goal to develop 
know-how to increase the chances of Austrian ac­
tors in international RTD programmes, the combi­
nation of resources to build critical masses for 
industrial RTD as well as the stimulation of private 
funding for RTD (Edler et al, 2004). Nevertheless 
there are differences between these programmes, 
too: Kpius was more formalized and structured than 
the Kind and Knet Programmes; Kpius was stronger 
knowledge-driven and focused the promotion of 
excellence in research, whereas K^d and Knet were 
stronger industry-driven and interested more in 
technology transfer; Kpius required the establishment 
of new structures, with the majority of researchers 
concentrated at one physical location, whereas Kmd 
and Knet could consist of virtual centres and 
networks.
In light of the strong similarities between the two 
programmes, the question arises why they coexisted 
in the comparatively small Austrian RTD system. 
And once again the main reason is the institutional 
set-up of the Austrian RTD system, one of which’s 
characteristics is that several ministries compete for 
the competencies for RTD. Apparently there were 
efforts from the side of the BMwA to fuse the pro­
gramme ideas of Kpius and Kind, which had been 
blocked by the Minister for Economic Affairs, Han­
nes Famleitner (interview 2-6). Two years later there 
was resistance from the highest management level of 
the BMWV against the inclusion of the administra­
tive units of the BMwA into, in 2000, the newly es­
tablished Ministry for Transport, Innovation and 
Technology (BMVIT), which would have brought a 
fusion of the two programmes (interview 2-6, 2-4).
Assessing the competence of the competence 
centre programmes
Since 2001 Kind and Knet had been administered by 
the Research Promotion Fund (FFF), and were 
loosely coordinated with Kpius in project-clearing 
workshops in which TIG and FFF staff took part. By 
spring 2003 the BMVIT and the BMwA decided to 
start an inter-ministerial dialogue which included the 
other major federal RTD actors, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry for Education, Research 
and the Arts (Österreichisches Bundesministerium 
fur Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kunst, BMBWK). 
The goal was to decide whether the different compe­
tence centre programmes should be differentiated 
more or stay as they were. During the first meeting 
the representatives of the BMwA reportedly invited
the BMVIT officials to join the evaluation of the 
K^d and Knet Programmes — much to the latter’s 
surprise — which the BMVIT after some discus­
sions decided to do (interview 3-2, 3-4).
In the summer of 2001 a research consortium, 
consisting of the German Fraunhofer Institute for 
Systems Technology and Innovation Research (ISI) 
and the Austrian Institute for SME Research, started 
to evaluate the competence centre programmes. In a 
few months’ time several dozen interviews, several 
workshops and an extensive data analysis led to the 
final report, ‘Assessment of the Competence Centre 
Programmes’ Future ( Kpius and Kmd, Knet) and the 
Future of the Competence Centres’, which was pub­
lished in January 2004. The name of the whole exer­
cise, “assessment”, was carefully worded by the 
ministerial actors, who wanted to circumvent the ne­
cessity to stop or radically alter their programmes in 
the case of unwished and unforeseen evaluation re­
sults (interview 3-2, 3-4).
The report notes that the concepts and problem 
definitions of the programmes are adequate and, by 
and large, evaluates the programmes positively. All 
programmes are criticized on a number of accounts, 
with the Kind and Knet Programmes drawing more 
criticism than the Kpius Programme. The researchers 
found that Kind and Knet produced only limited effects 
for a number of reasons. One is that the programmes 
drew mainly large companies which led to windfall 
profits: the firms mainly used public money to carry 
out RTD exercises they would have engaged into 
otherwise, too. Further criticism addresses the lack 
of a separation between final decision-maker 
(BMwA) and the operational agency (FFF), hinder­
ing “greater independence, transparency and accep­
tance” (Edler et al, 2003: XIX).
Analysing the Kpius Programme, the evaluation 
team found that programme structure and organiza­
tion of evaluation “servefs] as role model” and can 
be “regarded as an example of ‘best practice’ worthy 
of imitation” (Edler et al, 2003: XIX). The Kpius Pro­
gramme is criticized for the unclear future of the 
centres, which caused a lot of insecurity for the co­
operation partners. All three programmes were criti­
cized for not taking advantage of building synergies 
between different centres or even between the 
programmes.
The assessment ended with a number of sugges­
tions for policy. Kpius, the researchers state, should 
remain being driven by science, whereas the Kind and 
Knet Programmes should pursue the innovation tar­
gets even more clearly. It should be assessed for all 
programmes whether there is still sufficient need and 
demand from industry and universities. More coor­
dination with the states should take place earlier and 
the Kind and Knet Programmes should become more 
objectified in design and conduct. The criteria for 
evaluation and establishment of centres and net­
works should become clearer and the role division 
between political function, project management and 
evaluation should become clearer, too.
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Re-positioning of the competence centre 
programmes
After several efforts to centralize the functions of the 
intermediary agencies responsible for carrying out 
Austrian RTD policy by the end of 2003 the federal 
government decided to form the Research Promotion 
Agency (Forschungsförderungsgesellschaft, FFG). 
Besides the FFF, the Austrian Space Agency (ASA), 
the Office for International Research and Technol­
ogy Cooperation (BIT) and the TIG were fused into 
the new FFG in September 2004 (compare 
Kritzinger et al, 2006). The TIG staff took responsi­
bility for Area II, the “Structural Programmes”, into 
which also the Kpius Programme fell.
By 2005 around 270 companies of different sizes 
were cooperating with research organizations in 18 
KpiUs Centres. For 2005 the FFG spent €11.2 million 
on the Kpius Programme, which made it the second 
largest initiative among the structural programmes, 
only to be surpassed by the Kind and Knet Pro­
grammes, which together accounted for €12.6 mil­
lion. In the same year also 22 Kind Centres and Knet 
Networks were active in which approximately 180 
companies cooperated. Relating the competence cen­
tre programmes to the overall expenditures for RTD 
promotion of the FFG in 2005, which were €101.44 
million, they were among the largest programmes 
(Österreichische Forschungsgesellschaft, 2006).
During the last stages of the assessment, represen­
tatives of the two ministries had begun to discuss the 
future of the programmes bilaterally. Their aim was to 
meet the widespread criticism on the two competing 
competence centre programmes and resist the outside 
pressure to merge these. To do so, they had to legiti­
mize all three programme lines, which in general were 
perceived as successful (interview 3-13).
An opportunity arose with the final report of the 
assessment advocating a further differentiation of 
the programmes (Edler et al, 2004). The strategy 
was to allow a gradual transformation of the centres 
to arrive at a number of Fraunhofer-like organiza­
tions, linked to existing university and extra­
university research structures and financed to a large 
degree by firms and the research organizations. This 
plan failed mainly due to the resistance of the states, 
who were not willing to pay for the centres without 
having a say in their set-up.
After simmering for one year, in 2005 discussions 
on the future of the competence centre programmes 
intensified again. Soon the major centre stakeholders 
accepted the decision of the two ministries that the 
programmes should be brought together. This con­
sensus had two effects. First, the Kind and Knet Pro­
grammes, financed by the BMwA, beginning with 
mid-2005, were also administered by the FFG’s 
Area II (the former TIG). Second, another discussion 
process on the renewal of all the competence centre 
programmes was started. At the end of 2005 an in­
ternal paper was proposed, which was a shaky con­
sensus between the major stakeholders of the
The creation of knowledge is a 
historically contingent social process 
insofar as new knowledge always 
builds on and relates to older 
knowledge. This becomes apparent in 
the case of the establishment of the 
Kpius Programme
programmes — the two ministries, the FFG, the 
states, industry and the Council for Research and 
Technological Development.4 In addition several 
rounds of discussions took place with universities, 
polytechnics and extra-university research institutes. 
However it took another two years until the new pro­
gramme could start. Fiercely led negotiations on 
funding and selection criteria were the reason for the 
delay (interview 3-13, 3-13).
The new competence centre programme COMET 
(Competence Centres for Excellent Technologies), 
which was presented to the public in August 2006, is 
in fact a mixture of the Kpius, Kind and Knet Pro­
grammes. Three programme lines have been created: 
the rather short-term K-projects, which are more 
flexible and less criteria-based, targeting among oth­
ers the Kind and Knet centres; the K1 centres, which 
are oriented at the Kpius centres selected by hard cri­
teria; the longer-term K2 centres, which are a new 
and larger category and which should orient them­
selves on the global level. Financing comes again 
from three sources, the federal state, industry and the 
states, with the shares differing from programme 
line to programme line. The first projects and centres 
were selected in September 2007.
Policy-relevant knowledge and learning
Learning from experience: the ITF record
The creation of knowledge is a historically contin­
gent social process insofar as new knowledge always 
builds on and relates to older knowledge. This be­
comes apparent in the case of the establishment of 
the Kpius Programme. Indeed this policy initiative 
can hardly be understood without taking into ac­
count the history of Austrian RTD policy, especially 
the experiences made by Austrian policy actors with 
the ITF. While the ITF certainly was not an efficient 
instrument of RTD policy, and only in some cases 
was an effective one (Biegelbauer, 2005), it was an 
important policy tool around which policy learning 
took place during the 1990s in Austria (interviews
2-1, 2-13, 3-5). The first lesson Austrian RTD 
policy actors learned from the ITF was that neither
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ministries nor intermediary agencies could expect 
any deeper interest in the policy field from the side 
of politicians. This insight led actors from both min­
istries and intermediary agencies to regularly take 
the matter into their own hands when they came to 
create a new policy initiative.
Second, the history of the ITF made it all too clear 
that the lack of funding in RTD policy was there to 
stay. The hopes that any time soon more money 
would be available to develop larger and more com­
plex RTD policy programmes had subsided for 
most, if not all, policy actors by the mid-1990s.5 It 
was the first two issues, the marginal interest of poli­
ticians in the policy field and the lack of money, 
which had exacerbated the coordination problems 
between the different ministerial actors, which not 
only included the science, transport and economics 
ministries in their varying constellations and set-ups, 
but also the Ministry of Finance and the Federal 
Chancellery (Biegelbauer, 2005).
Third, the two issues mentioned above also in­
vited the creation of different allotments or fiefdoms 
in the policy area, which had been created and were 
fiercely defended by ministerial actors (Griessler,
2003). It was very difficult to break through the mis­
trust hindering cooperative activities between high- 
ranking ministry officials on a larger scale. All of 
this led to a further increase in the short-termism of 
Austrian RTD policy, with ministerial actors often 
engaging rather in tactics and not in strategies 
(interview 3-5).
Fourth, Austrian RTD politics in the 1990s fea­
tured a policy style which had come into existence 
due to the prevalence of the Austrian neo-corporatist 
social partnership. Political decisions were often 
made in the framework of networks which, besides 
central ministerial actors and a small number of ex­
perts not only included social partners, but also were 
made in the very style in which decisions came into 
being in the framework of policy fields dominated 
by the social partnership. Such decision-finding and 
-making procedures frequently included little codifi­
cation, often informal meetings of a relatively small 
number of decision-makers under exclusion of those 
experts, who were not affiliated with the social part­
ners (interview 2-1,3-13).
Put differently, it was mainly two lessons which 
were learned by policy actors from the ITF record: 
First, there was lots of learning of how (not) to run 
RTD programmes. Repeatedly interview partners 
pointed out how important the ITF was in the sense 
that actors could learn how to identify problems, write 
policy documents or evaluate programmes — includ­
ing the possibility to fail in their initiatives (inter­
views 2-1, 3-5, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10). Second, policy actors 
learned that the ITF was not the right instrument for 
making successful RTD policies in a systematic and 
efficient way. The latter point was not only a recurring 
theme in interviews, but was driven home by one in­
terview partner, who spoke of his impression, “that 
many people have almost experienced ... a trauma,
insofar as productive work for 10 years [in the ITF, 
PB] was very difficult” (interview 3-5).
The experiential learning as a result of the ITF 
experience took place in parallel on a personal level 
and on the level of the Austrian RTD policy com­
munity, which comprises of a few dozen individuals. 
Actors learned from their own ‘traumatic’ and frus­
trating experience in a very direct way. However 
they learned also indirectly, that is from each other, 
through communicative processes in formal and 
informal settings. In the end barely any interview 
partner argued that the ITF was a true success story 
(interview 1-1 was the only exception).
Learning from abroad: expert communities and 
(international) organizations
Several previous policy papers were formative for 
the competence centre programmes. The most 
important of these, ‘Knowledge as a Factor of Pro­
duction’ (Stampfer, 1996) and ‘Research and Com­
petition’ (Schmidt and Hochleitner et al, 1997) have 
been mentioned before. All of these papers are based 
upon up-to-date theoretical thinking from economics 
and social sciences. Most importantly, these papers 
are influenced by the vast literature on systems of 
innovation so influential in RTD policy-making 
beginning with the early 1990s (Freeman, 1987; 
Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Lundvall and Borrâs, 
1999; Mytelka and Smith, 2002; Biegelbauer and 
Borrâs, 2003; for Austria: Mayer, 2003). The inter­
national literature on innovation systems has found 
its way into the afore-mentioned documents either 
directly, or through the intermediation of policy ex­
perts, in many cases through TIP Programme par­
ticipants.
Indeed the policy experts, who had been nurtured 
through the Austrian Federal Government’s TIP 
Programme and other measures and were located in 
many cases either at the Wirtschaftsforschungsinsti- 
tut (Economic Research Institute), the Austrian Re­
search Centres Seibersdorf (ARCS) or Joanneum 
Research, as well as to a lesser extent at the Acad­
emy of Sciences and the Institute for Advanced 
Studies in Vienna, over the 1990s had been in an in­
creasingly closer contact with the policy-makers in 
the federal bureaucracy. They had taken on new 
functions over time: earlier RTD policy programmes 
had been conceived by civil servants from the fed­
eral ministries. Yet for the Kpius Programme the role 
of the experts was not only to provide knowledge, 
but also to actively participate in constructing the 
main policy documents upon which the Kpius Pro­
gramme rested (interviews 3-4, 3-5). While these 
changes have to be seen in the framework of the re­
structuring of federal bureaucracies taking place in 
most OECD countries during the last two decades 
(Peters, 1996; Aberbach, 2003), in the case of Aus­
trian RTD policy, they also show the significance of 
the rise of a part of the expert community in a policy 
field which did not exist before the mid-1980s.
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The extensive co-production of RTD programmes 
by civil servants and policy experts from research 
organizations was made possible not only through 
the TIP Programme and the more far-reaching 
changes in the public understanding of structures 
and functions of public bureaucracies all over the 
world, but also by the internationalization of the 
RTD policy field. Networks of policy experts were 
formed around international organizations, most im­
portantly the OECD and the European Union, from 
the 1970s onward (Armingeon and Beyeler, 2004; 
Marcussen, 2004). The impact of the OECD net­
works in Austria often was rather indirect in the 
sense that in RTD policy Austria often did not take 
part in policy initiatives of the OECD (interviews
1-5, 2-14). Yet the federal government sent national 
policy experts frequently to Paris, either as perma­
nent residents, or to take part in the frequent work­
shops and meetings of the various working groups. 
Therefore, despite the missing grand strategy of 
Austria towards the OECD and the frequent reluc­
tance to follow OECD suggestions (interviews 1-2,
2-14), there was a slow and indirect but steady effect 
of the Austrian OECD membership upon the broader 
knowledge base of Austrian expertise in the RTD 
policy field (interview 2-1). *
The Austrian EU accession in 1995 had a 
more immediate impact. It affected not only civil 
servants responsible for international relations and 
experts from research organizations, as had been the 
case with the OECD, but also all the other ministry 
officials and policy experts due to the effects of the 
acqui communautaire on Austrian law and the bind­
ing nature of many of the agreements being struck in 
the very working groups and council meetings Aus­
trian representatives were taking part in. Even al­
though the EU activities were not taken serious by 
all ministerial staff at the beginning of the Austrian 
membership (interviews 3-5, 1-1), the effects of a 
large number of civil servants going to Brussels 
and coming back with new impressions and 
papers based upon other working styles and adminis­
trative traditions were being felt immediately. 
Knowledge of the way in which RTD policy pro­
grammes were made in other countries, the ways in 
which they were implemented and evaluated, began 
to seep into the workings of the ministerial machin­
eries starting with the international departments re­
sponsible for working with the European Union 
from early on. As one former ministry official 
observes
Policy developments in the national arena are 
often pushed forward via real or supposed 
‘Brussels’ or ‘European’ standards, no bench 
remains unmarked. Ministry mandarins go to 
European meetings with their agendas in mind 
and come home with a kind of conviction that 
something must be changed in their country 
due to the ‘standards’ mentioned. (Stampfer, 
2003: 150)
The effects of international organizations and trans­
national networks emanating from these are there­
fore twofold (compare Stone, 2004). International 
organizations reach into national RTD systems, such 
as the Austrian one, via the knowledge they offer, 
which is taken and processed through officials from 
national ministries, intermediary agencies and policy 
experts from research institutes and consultancies. 
They also have a more direct effect on actors in pro­
viding platforms in which experts exchange experi­
ences and opinions, sometimes under the tutelage of 
the international organization, sometimes based on 
their own initiative (Marcussen, 2004).
In the case of the establishment of the Kpius Pro­
gramme these international experiences were sup­
plemented by a more direct knowledge transfer from 
three countries with ample knowledge of the policy 
instrument envisaged by the Austrian policy-makers.
In 1997, during the preparation of the policy 
document for the Kpius Programme, a group of policy 
experts (in many cases from the TIP network) and 
ministry officials travelled to Sweden and Canada in 
order to analyse the Swedish Competence Centres 
Programme, which had been set up in 1995, and the 
Canadian Networks of Centres of Excellence Pro­
gramme, which had been running since 1989. In 
1998 a last and most extensive study visit was made 
to Australia. There was a consensus among inter­
view partners that these trips had been worthwhile, 
as they had led to a marked increase in knowledge of 
what was perceived to be international best practice 
in the area of competence centres (interviews 3-2,
3-5). The study visits were not only examples of 
direct learning; they also led to the building of an in­
ternational network of experts, which later on was 
accessed by the TIG staff.
Indeed one instance in which the TIG personnel 
made use of these international contacts was a series 
of international projects which were directed by 
TIG/FFG staff. From 2002 until 2004 three EU- 
fmanced projects, the Multi-Actors Multi-Measures 
Programme Thematic Network, the starMAP and 
discoMAP were active, in which 11 international 
partners took part. The aim of the three projects was 
to exchange insights on multi-actor multi-measures 
programmes (MAPs) such as competence centres 
(RoadMAP, 2004; StarMAP, 2004).
One of the outcomes of the MAP projects was an 
evaluation of the international influences the ana­
lysed competence centre projects were subject to. In 
the final document of the MAP project (RoadMAP,
2004), the authors identified different families and 
pedigrees of MAPs. The Engineering Research Cen­
tres Programme of the US National Science Founda­
tion in the 1980s was identified as the ‘mother’ of 
the competence centre programmes, directly influ­
encing the Australian Cooperative Research 
Centre Programme and the Swedish Competence 
Centres Programme. The Austrian Kpius Programme 
studied the Australian, the Swedish and Canadian 
examples and the Hungarian Competence Centre
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Programme was based upon the US model, but took 
into account the Swedish and Australian and Aus­
trian experiences when it was established in 2000. 
The Estonian Competence Centres Programme was 
established in 2003 after Estonian policy experts had 
studied the Hungarian, Swedish and Austrian 
programmes.
Learning for policy and for politics
Sometimes a certain social practice has to fulfil sev­
eral functions at the same time. Examples from the 
early history of the Kpius Programme are the meet­
ings of the group consisting of ministry officials and 
policy experts setting up the original Kpius policy pa­
pers with representatives from science and industry. 
These meetings took place at a time when the central 
part of the policy paper had already been in exis­
tence (interviews 3-3, 3-5). They had a twofold pur­
pose: First, they were to get feedback on the 
proposed programme from the two core communi­
ties, science and industry. Second, the meetings 
should legitimize the process leading to the new and 
relatively large as well as quite innovative policy 
programme. Given that according to an interview 
partner (interview 3-5) the original policy paper*was 
not crucially changed by these discussion processes, 
it seems fair to say that the legitimation was at least 
as important as was the feedback function.
Indeed two reasons come to mind why such a le­
gitimation might have been of increased importance 
for the political process leading up to the Kpius Pro­
gramme. First, the proposed policy programme was 
radically different from other policy measures im­
plemented in Austria by the end of the 1990s. It was 
not the policy goal of bringing together science and 
industry to cooperate more closely, but it was the 
way in which this cooperation was to be achieved 
that was so new. The competence centres were not 
only larger than most of the hitherto existing Aus­
trian RTD centres, and not only was state funding to 
be terminated after seven years, but also they were 
to be closely monitored through these seven years. 
And perhaps most important of all, the way in which 
they should be selected formed the very centre of the 
policy paper advancing the programme, making the 
selection and evaluation procedures the proposed 
centres had to go through very strictly based upon 
preconceived criteria.
Second, the way in which the policy idea came 
into existence and the following policy document 
was drafted was quite unusual for Austrian RTD 
policy-making. As has been pointed out before, nei­
ther were the social partners granted a privileged po­
sition in the discussion process, nor were other 
ministries asked for their opinion: a procedure which 
otherwise was common practice and which under the 
specific circumstances of the Austrian RTD policy 
structures — lack of funding, unclear responsibili­
ties, little interest from politicians — was quite 
cumbersome and partially responsible for stifling the
creation of innovative policy instruments during 
much of the 1990s. In light of previous experiences 
with policy initiatives, the way in which the Kpius 
Programme was conceived could be seen as a form 
of political learning. Different from the term policy 
learning, political learning relates to strategies of 
“selling” a policy to stakeholders and constituencies 
(May, 1992).
An instrument supporting policy learning
The assessment of the competence centre pro­
grammes, which was carried out in 2003 and 2004, 
was an instrument facilitating policy learning. The 
assessment exercises fostered learning in different 
forms. First, the fact that an evaluation-like analysis 
of the competence centre programmes had already 
been made forced policy actors from ministries as 
well as intermediary agencies to look back and re­
flect upon their role in the policy programmes and 
their work in the first years of these measures. These 
reflective activities often had a quasi-binding qual­
ity, since they were done in a semi-public way, in in­
terviews to be transcribed, in statements to be taken 
up into the assessment reports or in reactions to the 
expert’s reports in workshops, where other policy 
actors would take notice of them (interview 3-11).
Second, the interactions of policy-makers took on 
a different character since they were structured by a 
planned common activity, that is the assessment ex­
ercise, entailing workshops and an itinerary with 
milestones. Policy-makers from different ministries, 
who were barely communicating with each other due 
to antagonistic relationships, now had to interact in 
one way or another (interview 3-11).
Third, the mixture of outsiders to the Austrian 
RTD system, the experts from the German Fraun­
hofer Gesellschaft, and insiders, from the Austrian 
KMU Research, helped to provide the team carrying 
out this study a more neutral position, acceptable to 
all actors taking part in the process (interview 3-4). 
The competence centre programmes were discussed 
with their strengths and weaknesses in a way that did 
not exclude, let alone stigmatize, some of the dis­
cussants. High-ranking ministry officials began to 
communicate with each other and learned about 
their counterpart’s views (interview 3-11). The al­
ready existing conflicts between the two involved
The interactions of policy-makers took 
on a different character: policy-makers 
from different ministries, who were 
barely communicating with each other 
due to antagonistic relationships, now 
had to interact in one way or another
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ministries’ leading civil servants had reached into 
some of the competence centres, where actors held 
the belief that one ministry and one programme were 
to be preferred over the others. Through the process 
of the assessment this polarization was weakened. 
The discussions in and around the assessment exer­
cise started a communicative process, which led to a 
concentration of management functions regarding 
the three competence centre programmes in the same 
FFG unit and to plans to reform the programmes and 
ultimately to create a single programme with differ­
ent programme lines (interview 3-11).
Conclusions
The main focus of the paper was to answer the ques­
tion why a radical policy innovation such as the Kplus 
Programme could take place in the Austrian RTD 
system, which before had rejected changes for a pro­
longed period of time. It could be established that 
the Kplus Programme indeed was innovative for Aus­
tria. The policy initiative was quite large in Austrian 
terms, and it was more based on formal criteria than 
any top-down RTD policy measure in existence 
before, with all the targets of the policy set ex ante.
Moreover the Kplus Programme was highly inter­
nationalized. It was set up under consideration of 
similar programmes in other OECD countries, 
namely Australia, Canada and Sweden. From the 
very beginning the main instrument for the selection 
of competence centres was the utilization of inter­
national peer reviewers.
In addition the Kplus Programme was quite reflec­
tive. On an international level the MAP projects 
have been used as instruments for reflection and dis­
cussion. An internal evaluation of the programme 
was performed in 2001 followed by an international 
assessment in 2004 (Edler et al, 2004) and further 
work by others, such as Steyer (2006), who analysed 
programme outputs at the firm level.
Several reasons have been provided for why a 
major policy innovation such as the Kplus Programme 
was possible in the framework of an RTD system, 
which before had been resisting major change for a 
decade. The most important observation is that this 
policy innovation cannot be explained by looking at 
the Austrian political system. Neither had there been 
major changes in the Austrian Government preced­
ing the introduction of the Kplus Programme — a new 
coalition government between the Conservative 
Party and the Freedom Party took power more than 
two years later, in early 2000. Nor can political 
activism be found on the highest level of politics — 
the major policy reform proposed as part of the 
paper ‘Research and Competition’ (Schmidt et al, 
1997) had been rejected the year before.
An important reason for the establishment of the 
Kplus Programme was that a sizeable part of the 
Austrian RTD system was unsatisfied with the at 
that time largest Austrian top-down RTD policy
instrument, the ITF. The lack of political steering, 
the cooperation problems between the different min­
istries and other actors and the lack of funding made 
the ITF an inefficient policy instrument in the eyes 
of a number of political actors (interview 3-5; 
Griessler, 2003; Biegelbauer, 2005).
It was precisely the lack of funding, a key compo­
nent of Austrian RTD policy over most of the 1980s 
and 1990s, which the new Kplus Programme in 1998 
had not had to face. Funds from the Technology 
Milliard and from the privatization of the Austrian 
Federal Railways glass-fibre network saved the pol­
icy actors proposing the programme from the fate of 
many policy initiatives: having to combine financing 
from a multitude of different sources in order to be 
able to keep a programme running (interviews 3-5,
3-12).
The above-mentioned reasons made it easier for 
the BMWV civil servants to construct the pro­
gramme. The introduction of the new initiative was 
also eased by the fact that a single programme 
caused much less upheaval than a major policy 
reform such as the one which had caused so much 
discussion in 1997: it could be ‘sold’ much more 
easily to the RTD policy community.
Another element of an explanation addresses the 
strategy of the BMWV, which deviated from the 
policy style typical for the Austrian RTD policy in 
the 1980s and 1990s and therefore caught other ac­
tors by surprise. Indeed the ministry officials did not 
invite other ministries, most importantly the BMwA, 
to discuss the establishment of the new programme 
but went ahead with a small group consisting mainly 
of experts from intermediary agencies and the social 
partners. Even in this process there was a core group 
which drafted the policy document and which con­
sisted only of a handful of persons, a BMWV civil 
servant and a few experts from extra-university re­
search organizations, which were part of the TIP 
Programme. At the time when the policy paper was 
presented to other actors in the Austrian RTD sys­
tem, not only was the programme already fully 
worked out, but the ministerial actors were not will­
ing to change the planned programme on a large 
scale anymore (interview 3-2, 3-5).
Another task of the paper was the analysis of 
the Kplus Programme through the perspective of a pol­
icy learning approach. It was found that learning in­
deed played an important role in the establishment, 
implementation and evaluation of this competence 
centre programme. Already in the early phases of 
problem definition, the role of international and 
national experts has been found to be important, with 
the policy documents leading to the Kplus Programme 
referring among others to the national innovation sys­
tems approach. As part of the decision-finding and 
-making processes, experiences from other countries 
were used to set up the new policy initiative in Aus­
tria. Furthermore a co-evolution of the still quite 
young national RTD policy field and an increasingly 
internationalizing Austrian community of experts has
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been proposed. Globalization and Europeanization 
processes have fuelled the internationalization of ex­
ternal policy experts as well as civil servants, with the 
Austrian EU accession in 1995 having a clear thresh­
old effect (interviews 2-1, 2-4, 2-8). In the mid-1990s 
the internationalization of the whole policy field 
accelerated markedly, among other developments 
changing the predominant policy style in RTD policy­
making into a more formalized and internationalized 
one (interviews 2-1,3-12),
Several instruments have been found to facilitate 
learning processes. On the operational level of pro­
gramme management these were among others the 
MAP projects and the involvement of TIG into the 
Austrian chapter of the Society for Organizational 
Learning. Predominantly on a policy level, learning 
processes were triggered by the assessment exercises 
in 2003 and 2004. It was especially the latter activi­
ties and the structural changes taking place in the 
Austrian RTD system in the early 2000s which led 
to the reassessment of all three Austrian competence 
centre programmes and to the idea of establishing 
the new programme COMET, which replaced the 
previous programmes and fused them into one pol­
icy instrument.
The learning perspective was helpful as it allowed 
focusing the analysis on processes of the creation of 
policy goals, causality structures inscribed in poli­
cies, and political discourses which the policies were 
embedded in. When the notion of policy learning is 
applied in this way, it serves as an invitation to take 
a step back and look not at isolated political inci­
dents, but rather at political processes taking place 
over longer stretches of time — in this case, the dec­
ade of RTD policy-making from the mid-1990s to the 
mid-2000s. Over such a time period, the longer-term
development of Austrian RTD policy becomes better 
identifiable. Indeed the whole policy field has be­
come more international and professional and the 
way instruments were conceived and employed 
changed gradually. The Kpius Programme set an im­
portant example and was living proof that policies 
could be set up and run differently.
The already-mentioned internationalization pro­
cesses had effects on the central actors of the policy 
field: politicians came into contact with colleagues 
from other countries, who were used to do things 
differently, and got a sense of international standards 
(Stampfer, 2003). Civil servants similarly were con­
fronted with ideas new to them on a much more 
frequent basis than before and experts became part 
of an international community exchanging ideas 
(Mytelka and Smith, 2002; Stone, 2004). Indeed 
learning took place in all of these three groups on 
both the individual and organizational levels. More­
over learning through internationalization effects 
was both direct, for example in cases of actors com­
ing back from international meetings with new in­
sights, and indirect, in cases in which policy-makers 
gained a better understanding of policy-relevant is­
sues through policy experts, who themselves prof­
ited from the increasing internationalization of the 
expert community.
Ultimately the Kpius Programme became possible 
because of the more readily available knowledge of 
foreign countries’ policy instruments and a spread­
ing recognition among experts that international 
standards in RTD policy-making were above Aus­
trian ones — especially in lieu of the sometimes dire 
experiences with the ITF. The cognitive processes at 
the basis of this policy change are therefore a case of 
experiential learning.
Appendix: List of interviews
Interview partner Date Code
Policy expert 29 July 2003 2-1
Retired civil servant, BMWF/BMVIT 12 September 2003 1-1
Staff member, intermediary agency 29 September 2003 3-2
Director, intermediary agency 27 October 2003 3-3
Staff member, intermediary agency 11 November 2003 3-4
Civil servant, BMWF/BMVIT 11 November 2003 1-2
Civil servant, BMwA 24 November 2003 2-4
Former civil servant, BMWF/BMVIT 22 December 2003 1-5
Civil servant, BMBWK 13 January 2004 2-6
Director, intermediary agency 2 February 2004 3-5
Former civil servant, BMFin 30 April 2004 2-8
Civil servant, BMVIT 6 May 2004 2-9
Civil servant, BMVIT 1 June 2004 2-10
Director, intermediary agency 1 June 2004 2-11
Policy expert 16 January 2006 2-13
Civil servant, BMVIT 2 March 2006 2-14
Staff member, intermediary agency 3 March 2006 3-10
Policy expert 24 April 2006 3-11
Civil servant, BMVIT 3 July 2006 3-12
Staff member, intermediary agency 5 July 2006 3-13
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Notes
1. For overviews on Austrian RTD policy, see Gottweis and 
Latzer (2006); Pichler et al (2007).
2. For overviews see Page (2000), Maier et al (2003), Bandelow 
and Schubert (2003), Biegelbauer (2007b).
3. All of these problems had already been recognized in studies, 
eg Müller et al (1996), and policy papers, eg BMWV (1996).
4. The Council for Research and Technological Development 
was established with the year 2000 as an independent body 
advising the government on its research and technology 
strategy.
5. Only in 2004 did the GDP Austrian expenditures on RTD reach 
the OECD average of 2.25%. A slow but steady expansion of 
funds had led Austrian expenditure on RTD from 1.13% of 
GDP in 1981 to 1.88% in 1999 and accelerated in the 2000s to 
reach an estimated 2.47% in 2006 (BMWF, BMVIT, BMwA, 
2007).
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